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Employers that discriminate against employees on the
basis of age violate federal and state statutes.' Because dis-
crimination is often subtle, however, proving it at trial may be
difficult. As a result, the Supreme Court has found that
employers discriminate even when direct evidence of discrimi-
nation is absent.2 Instead of requiring direct evidence, courts
addressing these allegations require employers to establish
legitimate, non-discriminatory purposes for their actions.' This
test, developed by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green,4 is useful in cases lacking direct evidence of dis-
crinination; however, it is ill-suited to cases in which direct
evidence exists or in which employers have mixed motives5 for
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1. See, e.g., The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 621-24 (West 1981 & Supp. 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ch. 49.60 (1990).
2. Direct evidence is evidence that proves a fact without requiring the finder of
fact to make an inference or a presumption. State v. Thompson, 519 S.W.2d 789, 792-93
(Tenn. 1975). Direct evidence is often unavailable. See Thornbrough v. Columbus &
Greenville K.R., 760 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Unless the employer is a latter-day
George Washington, employment discrimination is as difficult to prove as who chopped
down the cherry tree.").
3. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-04 (1973), sets out the
classic test for allocating burdens of proof in discrimination cases. See inkfra notes 37-
54 and accompanying text.
4. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
5. In a mixed motive case, the employer's actions toward the employee are based
on a combination of legitimate and illegitimate motives. Mark C. Weber, Beyond Price
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their discriminatory acts." The McDonnell Douglas test is
inappropriate in the direct evidence setting because it provides
employers with unnecessary advantages that are prejudicial to
employees who have established direct evidence of discrimina-
tion. Furthermore, the McDonnell Douglas test is inadequate
in a mixed motive setting because the test fails to delineate
how and if employees can prevail when at least one of their
employer's motives is legitimate. Finally, the test is inappro-
priate in both the direct evidence and mixed motive settings
because it ignores Supreme Court precedent allocating the bur-
den of proof in employment cases to reflect the employer's
"superior access to the truth."7
Federal courts have recognized the inadequacy of the
McDonnell Douglas test in the direct evidence and mixed
motive settings. Although federal courts have long applied the
McDonnell Douglas test to allocate the burden of proof in cases
involving indirect evidence,8 they have used different methods
for allocating the burden of proof in cases involving direct evi-
dence of discrimination9 or in cases in which employers'
actions were motivated by a mixture of legitimate and illegiti-
mate considerations. 10
Washington courts have long been in the habit of using
federal case law to interpret the state anti-discrimination stat-
Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A New Approach to Mixed Motive Discrimination, 68 N.C.L.
REV. 495, 498 (1990).
6. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (adopting more stringent
test for mixed motive cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
7. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977). Justice O'Connor
found this rationale particularly compelling under the facts of Price Waterhouse, 490
U.S. at 273 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
8. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1980).
9. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985), the Supreme
Court held that the McDonnell Douglas test did not apply when the employee's case
was based on direct evidence of discrimination. See infra notes 70-78 and
accompanying text. Under Trans World Airlines, if the employee shows direct
evidence of discrimination, the employer can only prevail with an affirmative defense,
such as showing a bona fide occupational qualification. Trans World Airlines, 469 U.S.
at 121-22, 124.
10. The Supreme Court limited application of the McDonnell Douglas test to cases
in which the employer's decision was based on either exclusively legitimate or
exclusively illegitimate motives and held that a different standard applied to mixed
motive cases. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246-47. See infra notes 98-121 and
accompanying text. In Price Waterhouse, the Court held that if the employee
established that illegitimate factors were motivating factors in the employer's decision,
the employer had to show that the same decision would have been made absent the
improper motive. 490 U.S. at 244-45.
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ute." Nonetheless, Washington courts have clung to the
McDonnell Douglas test even in cases involving direct evidence
or mixed motives.12 Thus, Washington courts have failed to
incorporate the refinements made by federal courts regarding
the allocation of the burden of proof in discrimination cases.
Washington courts must abandon this slavish adherence to
McDonnell Douglas in cases involving direct evidence and
mixed motives. A more appropriate evidentiary standard
would place the burden on employers to establish that they
would have taken the same action toward the employees if age
had not been considered.' 3  A higher burden on employers
would help Washington courts realize the promise of "elimina-
tion and prevention" of discrimination offered by Washington
age discrimination legislation. 4
This Comment examines why Washington should place a
higher burden on employers in direct evidence and mixed
motive age discrimination cases. Because Washington courts
follow federal case law in interpreting state anti-discrimination
legislation, Section II examines relevant federal statutes and
the history of their interpretation by federal courts. Section
III explores the courts' modification of the traditional federal
approach found in direct evidence and mixed motive cases.
Section IV discusses Washington's anti-discrimination statute 5
and Washington's judicial interpretation of that statute. Sec-
11. In Grimwood v. University of Puget Sound, 110 Wash. 2d 355, 361-62, 753 P.2d
517, 520 (1988), the Washington Supreme Court looked to the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) to resolve an age discrimination
dispute. The court characterized federal cases as nonbinding guidelines and reserved
the right to adopt a different result consistent with the state statute. See also Dean v.
Municipality of Metro. Seattle, 104 Wash. 2d 627, 636, 708 P.2d 393, 398 (1985)
("[Flederal law may be considered instructive with regard to the interpretation of our
State discrimination laws."); Davis v. Department of Labor & Indus., 94 Wash. 2d 119,
125, 615 P.2d 1279, 1282 (1980) (state uses federal interpretation of Civil Rights Act of
1964 in state sex discrimination case); Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 93 Wash. 2d 368, 375,
610 P.2d 857, 862 (1980) (state uses federal law in sex and race discrimination context);
Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977) (state uses
federal age discrimination cases).
12. In Washington, even employees who have direct evidence of employer
discrimination or evidence of the employer's mixed motives are still required to prove
the four elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test. Stork v. International
Bazaar, Inc., 54 Wash. App. 274, 278, 774 P.2d 22, 24 (1989).
13. This test was applied in Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45.
14. The far-reaching goal of Washington's anti-discrimination statute is the
"elimination and prevention" of discrimination. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.010 (1990).
The legislature advised that such discrimination "menaces [the] free democratic state."
Id.
15. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 49.60.010-.330 (1989).
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tion V demonstrates Washington's insufficient response to fed-
eral developments in direct evidence and mixed motive cases.
Finally, Section VI identifies procedural safeguards that Wash-
ington courts can employ in these cases to avoid potential
problems caused by requiring employers to show that they
would have taken the same action absent discrimination. By
placing a greater burden of proof on the employer in direct evi-
dence and mixed motive cases, Washington courts can better
effectuate the goals of Washington's anti-discrimination
statute.
II. FEDERAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW
Washington courts have drawn heavily on the expertise of
federal courts to resolve discrimination questions.' 6 This reli-
ance is necessary because the state age discrimination statute
does not specify what criteria an employee must meet to pre-
vail in an age discrimination case. 7 Additionally, when seek-
ing precedent for discrimination cases, Washington courts
follow the federal pattern of minimizing distinctions among
cases involving sex, race, and age discrimination.'8 Because
16. See supra note 11.
17. See Grimwood v. University of Puget Sound, 110 Wash. 2d 355, 361, 753 P.2d
517, 520 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.60.010-.330 (1989).
18. For federal court cases, see, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469
U.S. 111, 121 (1984) (Title VII notion that employee benefits, which are part of
employment relationship, may not be distributed in a discriminatory manner applies
"with equal force" in age discrimination context because the substance of the ADEA
was "derived in haec verba from Title VII.") (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,
584 (1977)); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1978) (the common purpose
of ADEA and Title VII, coupled with similar language and evidence that a specific
ADEA provision was taken from Title VII, is sufficient to establish that the passages
should be treated similarly); Buckley v. Hospital Corp. of America, 758 F.2d 1525 (11th
Cir. 1985) (race discrimination case used to resolve age discrimination problem).
For state court cases, see, e.g., Grimwood, 110 Wash. 2d at 362 ("Because of the
similarity in purposes and substantive provisions in both the civil rights act and the
ADEA, the federal courts have employed ... [race discrimination standards] in age
discrimination cases." (citations omitted)).
Although courts have used sex and race discrimination cases to resolve evidentiary
issues in age discrimination cases, the cases will not be viewed as interchangeable in all
instances. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 575 n.14 (different provisions with respect to jury
trials between Title VII and ADEA suggest that Congress' intent varied when drafting
the two different laws). One commentator argues that trial courts tend to enter
judgments not withstanding verdicts disproportionately in age discrimination cases in
part because courts instruct juries to use evidentiary standards developed under Title
VII cases, and Title VII did not contemplate the jury trial setting. Kimberlye K.
Fayssoux, Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and Trial By
Jury: Proposals for Change, 73 VA. L. REV. 601, 603-04 (1987). Another commentator
argues that the Sixth Circuit has abandoned the application of Title VII burden of
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Washington courts apply federal sex and race discrimination
cases as precedent to resolve state age discrimination questions,
this Section will examine the federal statutes regarding sex,
race, and age discrimination as well as the federal cases that
have traditionally interpreted these statutes. The relevant fed-
eral statutes are Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967; the semi-
nal cases are McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green'9 and Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine.2
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196421 (Title VII) forms
the statutory basis for analyzing modern employment discrimi-
nation cases.22 Title VII prohibits employers from discriminat-
ing based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' Title
VII does not specify, however, what standards should be used
to measure statutory compliance or what burdens of proof
should be required of each party to meet those standards.24
Federal courts have filled these statutory gaps.2 The cases
interpreting Title VII provide the modern basis for interpret-
ing not only Title VII but also other discrimination statutes.26
proof analysis in ADEA cases because of differences in the acts and the situations they
address. Mary Comins Sutton, Comment, Should McDonnell Douglas Apply in ADEA
Cases? The Sixth Circuit's Answer, 15 U. TOL. L. REv. 1201 (1984).
19. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
20. 450 U.S. 248 (1980).
21. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1981 & Supp. 1990). The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was designed to heighten the effective enforcement of civil rights. H.R.
REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391. Title
VII itself was designed to eliminate discrimination through the use of formal and
informal procedures. id.
22. Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases"
Toward a Theory ofProcedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205,1226 (1981). The article
lists cases that marked the expansion of civil rights law into other contexts. Id. at 1226
n.89.
23. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 1981 & Supp. 1990).
24. At least one commentator notes that Congress rejected a standard of causation
that required employees to prove that discrimination was the sole cause of their
employers' decisions. Bonnie H. Schwartz, Comment, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 57
U.S.L W. 4409 (U.S. May 1, 1989) (No. 87-1167): Causation and Burdens of Proof in
Title VII Mixed-Motive Cases, 21 ARIz. ST. L.J. 501, 511 (1989). Senator Chase is
quoted from the Title VII debates: "If anyone ever had an action that was motivated
by a single cause, he is a different kind of animal from any I know of." Id. at 511 n.66
(quoting 110 CONG. REc. 13, 837-38 (daily ed. June 15, 1964)).
25. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 804 (1973).
26. See supra note 18.
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B Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
Although Congress did not address age discrimination in
the landmark Title VII legislation, it rectified this omission
three years later by passing the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967 (the ADEA). 7 The ADEA prohibits employ-
ers from discriminating against employees on the basis of age s
by protecting employees who are at least 40 years old.' The
purposes of the ADEA are to encourage the employment of
older workers on the basis of their ability' and to remedy the
problems older workers encounter in obtaining and retaining
employment.31 The ADEA prohibits the refusal to hire an
employee, the discharge of an employee, or the performance of
any other discriminatory act based on age.32
Although separate from Title VII,1 the ADEA is substan-
tively and procedurally similar to Title VII.' Because the
ADEA is a separate statute, however, some commentators and
courts have argued for separate evidentiary standards for
ADEA and Title VII cases.' Nevertheless, the majority of
cases interchange these statutory references.3 Analysis of the
cases interpreting these statutes is critical to understanding the
allocation of the burdens of proof in federal age discrimination
cases. Two pivotal cases defining the traditional burdens of
proof in age discrimination cases are McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine.
C. Traditional Federal Interpretation
In McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff, Green, was a black
27. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-24 (West 1981 & Supp. 1990).
28. Id. at § 623.
29. 29 U.S.C.A. § 631(a) (West 1981 & Supp. 1990).
30. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2213, 2214; 29 U.S.C.A. § 621(b) (1981 & Supp. 1990).
31. 29 U.S.C.A. § 621(a) (West 1981 & Supp. 1990). For further information about
the evidence of age discrimination considered by Congress in passing the ADEA, see
Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARv. L. REv. 380, 381-
84 nn.1-24 (1976) [hereinafter Harvard Note].
32. 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(1) (West 1981 & Supp. 1990).
33. One of the reasons stated for enacting separate age discrimination legislation
was to avoid overburdening the already overworked Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. Harvard Note, supra note 31, at 381.
34. Id. at 381 n.10 (provides a comparison of Title VII and ADEA provisions).
35. One commentator concedes that legislative history does not suggest a basis for
different treatment of Title VII and ADEA. Harvard Note, supra note 31, at 410-11.
However, he argues that the principles and policies underlying the issues of age and
sex discrimination suggest two different treatments. Id.
36. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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mechanic and laboratory technician employed at a manufactur-
ing facility in St. Louis, Missouri.37 After he was laid off as
part of a general work force reduction, Green participated in
acts of civil disobedience at the plant.' When McDonnell
Douglas later sought to hire technicians, it turned down
Green's application because of his participation in the civil dis-
obedience.39 Green then filed a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, ° claiming that his
application was denied because of his race and involvement in
the civil rights movement.4' The Supreme Court eventually
granted certiorari in the case to clarify the standards governing
employment discrimination.'
The Court held that employees bear the initial burden of
proving a prima facie case of discrimination.43 To meet that
burden, an employee must show the following: (1) the
employee is part of a racial minority; (2) the employee applied
and was qualified for a job that the employer was seeking to
fill; (3) the employee was rejected; and (4) the employer con-
tinued seeking applicants with similar qualifications after the
rejection." By satisfying these four elements, which comprise
the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas three-prong test, the
employee creates an inference that the employer's actions
were discriminatory.45
Once an employee establishes a prima facie case of dis-
crimination, the burden shifts to the employer to satisfy the
second prong of the McDonnell Douglas test.' Under the sec-
ond prong, the employer must "articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." '4 7 If
this burden is met, the employee can prevail only by establish-
ing that the employer's "legitimate" reason was, in fact,
pretextual. 48
37. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 794 (1973).
38. Id. at 794-95.
39. Id. at 796.
40. Id. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is the agency created by
Title VII to monitor discrimination claims. 33 U.S.C.A. 42 § 2000e-4 (West 1981 &
Supp. 1990).
41. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 794.
42. Id. at 798.
43. Id. at 802.
44. Id.
45. Schwartz, supra note 24, at 515-16.
46. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 804.
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Proof of pretext49 is the third and final prong of the
McDonnell Douglas test.' An employee can show pretext if
he or she proves that, despite the employer's stated reason for
the rejection, the employer's decision was based on the
employee's race.51 In McDonnell Douglas, the Court found
that Green had successfully presented a prima facie case of
race discrimination but that McDonnell Douglas had success-
fully rebutted it.52 The case was then remanded for the trial
court to determine whether the explanations offered by
McDonnell Douglas were merely pretextual.1
Thus, McDonnell Douglas establishes the standard for
allocating proof in cases involving employee allegations of
intentional unfair treatment by employers.54 The test does not
require that an employee present direct evidence of discrimina-
tion; rather, an employee need only establish an inference that
discrimination has occurred. The employer then attempts to
rebut this inference. If the inference is rebutted, the employee
can prevail only by showing that the employer's rebuttal was
pretextual.
Although it provided a basis for allocating burdens of
proof in discrimination cases, McDonnell Douglas left many
questions unanswered. In particular, the Court failed to spec-
ify how convincing an employee's showing of evidence must be
in order to shift the burden of proof to the employer. The
Court also failed to specify whether an employee's use of direct
evidence affects the allocations of the burdens of proof.
Finally, the Court did not explain what impact direct evidence
or mixed motives would have on the burdens of proof in dis-
crimination cases.
49. Pretext is established when the employee shows that the "proffered reason
was not the true reason for the employment decision." Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1980). Relevant evidence of pretext includes:
(1) different treatment among similarly situated employees; (2) a history of particular
treatment directed at the employee; (3) an employer policy regarding protected
activities; and (4) the employer's attitude toward the protected class. McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
50. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
51. Id. at 806 n.18.
52. Id. at 792.
53. Id.
54. Discrimination cases are divided into two categories. In disparate treatment
cases, such as McDonnell Douglas, the court finds a specific intent to discriminate.
Belton, supra note 22, at 1227. In disparate impact cases, the court eschews an intent
analysis and determines whether apparently neutral employment practices have a
negative impact on employees in protected classes. Id. at 1227-28.
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The Court addressed the first of these unresolved issues in
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,s leaving the
second and third issues, for the time being, unresolved. In
Burdine, the Court determined that employees must establish
their prima facie cases of discrimination by a preponderance of
the evidence.' Additionally, the Court stated that the burden
of persuasion remains with the employee throughout the
action.57 Once an employee establishes his or her case by a
preponderance of the evidence, the burden shifts to the
employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for its
action.58 This is a burden of production and not a burden of
persuasion.5 9 The employer need not prove that the allegedly
discriminatory act was motivated by a legitimate reason; the
employer need only raise a genuine factual issue as to whether
it discriminated 0
When the employer meets its burden of production, "the
factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity."'" In this
third prong of the McDonnell Douglas test, the employee's
burden of rebutting the employer's showing of a legitimate rea-
son for discharge "merges" with the employee's ultimate bur-
den of persuasion.2  The employee can satisfy the
requirements of the third prong either directly, by convincing
the court that "a discriminatory reason more likely motivated
the employer," or indirectly, by showing that the employer's
55. 450 U.S. 248 (1980). In this Title VII sex discrimination case, the employee
accounting clerk applied for a promotion to the position of Project Director. Id. at 250.
The position remained vacant for six months after her application, at which point the
employer hired a male from another division to fill the position and fired the plaintiff
as part of a reorganization. Id. at 250-51.
56. Id. at 252-53.
57. Id. at 253. By having the burden of persuasion, the employee is responsible for
convincing the trier of fact that the employer intentionally discriminated against the
employee. Id.
58. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
59. Id. at 255.
60. Id. at 254. The employer's burden when rebutting the employee's prima fade
case has been the subject of some confusion. In Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978), the Court, within the space of one paragraph, described the
defendant's burden to rebut as one of "proving" on the one hand and "articulating" on
the other. The Court later resolved this confusion in a per curium opinion by stating
that the employer merely had to "articulate" a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its actions in order to meet its burden. Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24,
25 (1978). A vigorous dissent argued that the distinction between "proving" and
"articulating" was illusory. Id. at 28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255.
62. Id. at 256.
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evidence in the second prong was "unworthy of credence."'
Hence, in addition to clarifying the degree of proof required in
the employee's prima facie case, the Court in Burdine elabo-
rated on the proof required in the third prong of the McDon-
nell Douglas test.6
In summary, McDonnell Douglas and Burdine represent
the classic method of analyzing discrimination claims. Under
this analysis, the employee establishes a prima facie case from
which discrimination is inferred. The employer can rebut this
inference by showing a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
the employer's action. To prevail, the employee must then
show either that the employer's explanation was pretextual or
that a discriminatory reason "more likely motivated the
employer. '
The test created in McDonnell Douglas and clarified in
Burdine has been used by federal and state courts in determin-
ing whether an employee has a valid discrimination claim
based on either age, sex, or race.' Nevertheless, traditional
federal analysis leaves two critical questions unanswered.
First, should a different analysis apply if the employee can
show direct evidence of discrimination? Second, should the
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine test apply to cases in which the
employer has mixed motives for its actions?
III. FEDERAL COURTS GRAPPLE WITH McDONNELL DOUGLAS
LIMITATIONS
In the wake of confusion regarding causation and burdens
of proof in discrimination cases,67 the Supreme Court and
63. Id.
64. Id. Prior to Burdine, the Supreme Court held that an employee could
establish pretext by showing that the employee would not have been dismissed "but
for" impermissible discrimination. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S.
273, 282 n.10 (1976). See also Cassino v. Reichhold Chem., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1343 (9th
Cir. 1987) (employee must show that age "made a difference" in the hiring decision);
Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 984 (9th Cir. 1981) (employee
establishes "but for" causation); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1019 (1st Cir.
1979) (employee must show that "but for" illegal motive he would not have been
fired).
Each of these cases uses the "but for" language to emphasize that the employee
need not prove that the discriminatory motive was the sole factor in the employer's
decision making process. Cassino, 817 F.2d at 1343; Kelly, 640 F.2d at 984-85; Loeb, 600
F.2d at 1019. For the Supreme Court's view of "but for" causation, see infira note 108.
65. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-56.
66. See supra note 18.
67. One commentator explains that the difficulty faced by the courts in resolving
mixed motive cases stems from the assumption that the traditional pretext approach is
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other federal courts have adopted two approaches to address
deficiencies unearthed by federal and state applications of the
McDonnell Douglas and the Burdine tests. One set of cases
diverging from McDonnell Douglas applies a distinct method of
allocating burdens of proof when employees show direct evi-
dence of discrimination. s Another set of cases applies a differ-
ent method of allocating burdens of proof when employers
have mixed motives for their allegedly discriminatory
actions.69 The following sections describe both of these
approaches and identify how they refine the traditional
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine analysis.
A. Special Analysis When Employee Shows Direct Evidence
The Supreme Court barred the application of McDonnell
Douglas to ADEA cases in which the employee's case is based
on direct evidence of the employer's discriminatory acts in
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston. ° In this pivotal case,
the employer airline's employment policy allowed airline cap-
tains to continue employment as flight engineers after reach-
ing age sixty.7' According to the bidding procedures described
in the company's collective bargaining agreement, a captain
must have attained flight engineer status prior to his 60th
birthday to qualify for continued employment. Under these
procedures, captains would submit bids for flight engineer posi-
tions prior to their 60th birthdays. When a vacancy occurred,
it would be assigned to the captain with the highest seniority
who had a standing bid. If no vacancy occurred or if the cap-
tain lacked sufficient seniority, the captain would be retired on
based on single motive decision making. Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation
in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
292, 301 n.40 (1982). Some circuit court opinions illustrate this difficulty. For example,
the Sixth Circuit found that once the plaintiff establishes that a defendant's motive
was more likely discriminatory than not, the defendant must show that the "same
decision" would have been made absent the discriminatory motive. Blalock v. Metal
Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 712 (6th Cir. 1985). The Eighth Circuit found that once the
employee establishes that an unlawful motive played a part in the employer's decision,
the employer can limit the remedy afforded to the employee by showing that the same
decision would have been made absent illegitimate motive. Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d
1318, 1323-24 (8th Cir. 1985). In contrast, the Third Circuit chose not to shift the
burden of proof to the defendant at all. Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d
910, 915-16 (3rd Cir. 1983).
68. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).
69. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1989).
70. 469 U.S. 111 (1985). For a definition of direct evidence, see supra note 2.
71. Trans World Airlines, 469 U.S. at 115.
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his or her 60th birthday.7"
The Supreme Court found that this procedure constituted
direct evidence of age discrimination.73 Under the airline's
procedure, captains who became disqualified to act as captains
for reasons other than age were allowed automatically to dis-
place flight engineers with less seniority. However, captains
disqualified because of age were not allowed to displace flight
engineers.74 Because this procedure constituted direct evi-
dence of discrimination, the Supreme Court held that the
McDonnell Douglas test was "inapplicable."
75
The Supreme Court noted that the shifting burdens of
proof specified in McDonnell Douglas were designed to allow
employees to have their "day in court" when no direct evi-
dence was available.76 If an employee establishes through
direct evidence that his or her employer's action was discrimi-
natory on its face, the only further inquiry is whether the
employer offers an affirmative defense.7 7 Although a narrow
interpretation would limit the applicability of Trans World
Airlines to ADEA actions, Trans World Airlines clearly repre-
sents a judicial willingness to stray from the narrow confines
of McDonnell Douglas when employees present direct evidence
of age discrimination.7
8
Some federal circuit courts have also cast aspersions on
the use of the McDonnell Douglas test in the direct evidence
setting. In Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ.,79 the Eleventh
Circuit noted that the McDonnell Douglas test does not offer
the sole method of proving employment discrimination.' The
court found that the first prong of McDonnell Douglas, in
which the employee establishes the prima facie case by creat-
ing an inference of discrimination, is not necessary if the
72. Id. at 115-16.
73. Id. at 121.
74. Id. at 116-17.
75. Id. at 121.
76. Id. at 121 (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979)).
77. Id. at 122.
78. The Court cited little authority for its position on direct evidence in Trans
World Airlines. The first reference was to Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977). The Teamsters court noted that McDonnell Douglas did not mandate that
employees introduce direct evidence. Id. at 358 n.44. However, Teamsters is actually
not relevant: although the McDonnell Douglas test does not require direct evidence,
the test does not forbid direct evidence.
79. 684 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1982).
80. Id. at 773.
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employee's case is based on direct evidence. 8' The Lee court
also found that the McDonnell Douglas analysis, as inter-
preted by Burdine, applies only to cases in which circumstan-
tial evidence creates an inference of discrimination. 2 In direct
evidence cases, the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas test is
not necessary because the direct evidence itself establishes the
employee's prima facie case rather than creating an inference
of discrimination."
In Lee, the court also rejected the second prong of the
McDonnell Douglas test in situations where employees show
direct evidence of discrimination." The court found that the
McDonnell Douglas test is inappropriate when discrimination
is shown by "strong, direct"' evidence. When direct evidence
establishes that the employer was motivated by racial discrimi-
nation, the employer's motive is unconstitutional, and the
employer must meet the higher burden of showing that the
same decision would have been reached absent the discrimina-
tory factor. 6
The court suggested two reasons for the higher burden in
Lee. First, the court stated that "[t]o allow rebuttal of a proved
case of discrimination simply by articulation of a plausible non-
discriminatory reason would be to 'stick [the employee] on the
four prongs of McDonnell Douglas when he has already shown
intentional discrimination by direct evidence."' 87 This judicial
favoritism for employees establishing discrimination cases by
81. Id. at 774.
82. Id. In Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1980),
the Court stated that "[t]he plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected
under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination."
83. Lee, 684 F.2d at 774.
84. Id.
85. Id. Lee does not define "strong, direct" evidence; the court is not clear about
whether "weak, direct" evidence would not meet the evidentiary threshold for this
analysis. In Lee, the school board had voted not to renew the contracts of three
teachers. Id. at 771. The evidence that the court found persuasive included the
testimony of the school principal and the superintendent of eduction, each of whom
testified that the school board's actions were racially motivated. Id. at 774-75.
86. Id (citing Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1976)).
87. Lee, 684 F.2d at 774 n.6 (quoting Ramirez v. Sloss, 615 F.2d 163, 169 n.10 (5th
Cir. 1980)). Although the Eleventh Circuit may be right, it is quoting Ramirez out of
context. In Ramirez the court used this language to criticize rigid application of the
first prong of McDonnell Douglas, in which the plaintiff establishes the prima fade
case. Ramirez, 615 F.2d at 169 n.10. The Lee footnote, however, uses this language to
criticize the second prong of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, which allows the
defendant to rebut the plaintiff's case. In fact, the Ramirez court applied the second
prong of McDonnell Douglas without criticism. Ramirez, 615 F.2d at 169.
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direct evidence implies that employers' motives as established
by direct evidence are more unshakable than the motives
established by inference. Therefore, a correspondingly higher
showing must be made by the employer to rebut the
employee's case. Second, the court implied that constitutional
considerations, such as racial discrimination, may explain the
higher burden of proof for employers rebutting direct
evidence."
The Eleventh Circuit, however, has also required a higher
burden from employers in cases in which a specifically pro-
tected constitutional right was not at issue. For example, in
Buckley v. Hospital Corp. of America,8 9 the court applied a
higher standard of proof when the employee provided direct
evidence in an age discrimination case. The court found that
three different methods of establishing a prima facie case of
age discrimination could be used. An employee can produce
(1) the evidence required to meet each of the three prongs of
the McDonnell Douglas test,' (2) direct evidence of the
employer's intent to discriminate,9 or (3) statistical proof of a
pattern of age discrimination.92 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit dis-
tinguished direct evidence cases from McDonnell Douglas
inferential cases. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit clearly
articulated this distinction by stating that employers bear a
heavier burden when rebutting direct evidence than when
rebutting an inference of discrimination created under the
McDonnell Douglas test.93
88. Lee, 684 F.2d at 774 (citing Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1976)).
89. 758 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1985).
90. Id. at 1529.
91. Id. The court sets out this test in Buckley without citing authority for the
direct method of proving discrimination. Several paragraphs later, however, the court
cites Lee with approval on the issue of direct evidence; Lee is presumably intended to
be the source of the test. Id. at 1529-30.
92. Id. at 1529. See also Pace v. Southern Ry. Sys., 701 F.2d 1383, 1388 (11th Cir.
1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983). In Buckley the court refers to proving a prima
fame case via statistical evidence without citing any authority. The court may have
intended to reference the line of cases establishing discrimination by proof of
discriminatory impact. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Any
discussion of disparate impact is outside the scope of this Comment.
93. Buckley, 758 F.2d at 1529. Even before the Eleventh Circuit distinguished this
heavier burden in Buckley, the First Circuit had placed a higher burden on employers
in direct evidence cases. The First Circuit noted that the purpose of McDonnell
Douglas is to provide "the employee his day in court despite the unavailability of direct
evidence, and entitles him to an explanation from the defendant-employer for
whatever action was taken." Loeb v. Textron Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979).
In dicta, the Loeb court determined that when an employee provides direct evidence of
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These cases suggest that the federal courts do not mechan-
ically apply the McDonnell Douglas test when interpreting the
ADEA and Title VII. In Trans World Airlines, the Supreme
Court clearly rejected the application of the McDonnell Doug-
las test to age discrimination cases under the ADEA when
direct evidence was presented; however, the Court did not
explain what standard would be used to measure the
employer's attempt to rebut the employee's case. The Elev-
enth Circuit, also straying from the McDonnell Douglas test,
filled this gap by allowing the employer to prevail if it could
show that the same action would have been taken toward the
employee absent discrimination. 4
B. Special Analysis When Employers Act
With Mixed Motives
Mixed motive cases provide another troublesome area for
the application of the McDonnell Douglas test. In a mixed
motive case, the employer's action against the employee is the
product of both legitimate and illegitimate reasons.95 Legiti-
mate reasons include misconduct or lack of qualifications. Ille-
gitimate reasons include racial or sexual stereotyping.9 In
analyzing mixed motive cases, courts face the reality that
employers rarely base employment decisions on purely one
reason.' If the courts strictly applied the McDonnell Douglas
analysis in mixed motive cases, employees would never prevail
because, by definition, employers in mixed motive cases always
have at least one legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for their
actions. In such a situation, an employer would rebut the
employee's prima facie case with evidence of its legitimate
a discriminatory motive, the McDonnell Douglas test might well confuse the jury. Id.
at 1018. Instead, the court suggested that, in this type of case, the jury merely be
instructed that the employee has to prove age discrimination by a preponderance of
the evidence. Id. The Loeb opinion demonstrates the First Circuit's willingness to
depart from the confines of McDonnell Douglas when the employee presents direct
evidence of employment discrimination.
94. Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 774 (11th Cir. 1982); Buckley,
758 F.2d at 1529-30. Note that the Eleventh Circuit's analysis is similar to the mixed
motive approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 409
U.S. 228 (1989). See infra notes 98-121 and accompanying text.
95. Weber, supra note 5, at 498.
96. Id.
97. Sam Stonefield, Non-Determinative Discrimination, Mixed Motives, and the
Inner Boundary of Discrimination Law, 35 BUFF. L. REv. 85, 113 (1986). 'The mixed
motive.., problem is inherent; it reflects the contrast between the discrete nature of
the regulatory prohibition and the richness of human interactions." Id.
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motivation, and the employee would not be able to establish
that the proffered reason was entirely pretextual.
The Supreme Court addressed the questions of causation
and burdens of proof in mixed motive cases in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.' In Price Waterhouse, a female
accounting associate, Ann Hopkins, sued her employer claim-
ing sex discrimination when she was not promoted to a part-
nership position.9  When the firm evaluated her bid for
partnership, it received both positive and negative input from
its partners. Partners in her home office praised her role in
obtaining a $25 million contract and found that her perform-
ance was "virtually at the partner level."'' 1 None of the other
eighty-seven partnership candidates, all of whom were male,
had secured major contracts for the firm.110 Most partners
praised both her character and her accomplishments.
112
Some partners, however, were not as supportive of Hop-
kins' candidacy and identified her as overly aggressive and
abrasive with the staff. 0 3  She was criticized as being
"macho";104 one partner asserted that she "overcompensated
for being a woman."' 0 5 A key partner recommended that she
should behave in a more feminine way to improve her likeli-
hood of becoming a partner.1l 6 These comments suggested that
Hopkins' sex played a role in the evaluation of her interper-
sonal skills.
The Court held that if an employee in a Title VII case
shows that gender was a motivating factor" in the employer's
decision, the employer will be found liable unless it shows that
the same decision would have been made without, or "but for,"
consideration of gender 08 The plurality had no difficulty rec-
98. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
99. Id. at 231-32.
100. Id. at 233.
101. Id. at 234.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 234.
104. Id. at 235.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. The Court defined "motivating" factor as follows: "[1]f we asked the
employer at the moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we received a
truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a
woman." Id. at 250.
108. Id. at 244-45. The plurality reasoned that the "same decision" test applied in
McDonnell Douglas was not the same as "but for" causation. Id. at 240. The plurality's
allergy to the "but for" language appears to be based on the assumption that under a
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onciling its decision in Price Waterhouse with McDonnell
Douglas and Burdine. The Court noted that the application of
the McDonnell Douglas test was limited to cases involving a
single motive.109 The McDonnell Douglas/Burdine test "makes
no sense," the Court cautioned, when the employer's decision
was the result of a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate
motives. 110 However, under the test established in Price
Waterhouse, if an employee showed an impermissible motive
in a mixed motive case, the burden would shift to the employer
to show that the same decision would have been made absent
consideration of the employee's sex.11' Justices O'Connor and
White agreed with the plurality's result, although Justice
O'Connor reached the result through different reasoning." 2
"but for" test, the employee would be required to meet the "but for" standard. Id. at
241-42.
In contrast, Justice O'Connor viewed the plurality's test as one that placed a "but
for" burden on the employer. "I disagree with the plurality's dictum that the words
'because of' do not mean 'but-for' causation; manifestly they do." Id. at 262-64
(O'Connor, J., concurring). At least one commentator agrees with Justice O'Connor,
arguing that the practical result of the plurality's decision is to place a burden on the
employer to establish "but for" causation. Jean Calhoun Brooks, Note, Employment
Discrimination-The Supreme Court Liberates Title VII Mixed-Motive Cases From the
Procrustean Bed of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine Pretext Model-Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 25 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 345, 372 (1990). However, Justice White urged, as
does this Commentator, that we avoid "semantic discussions" regarding b'ut for"
causation. Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring).
The plurality based its decision, in part, on an earlier Supreme Court case, Mt.
Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1976), dealing with an employment
decision made against an employee for his use of constitutionally protected speech.
Note that this case was the same one relied upon, at least in part, in Lee v. Russell
County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 773 (11th Cir. 1982).
109. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 244-45.
112. Justice O'Connor focused on the direct/indirect evidence distinction when
rationalizing the departure from McDonnell Douglas. Id. at 270-72. (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). She asserted that the employer is not entitled to the same presumption of
good faith offered by the McDonnell Douglas analysis when direct evidence indicates
that the employer made "substantial reliance" on factors forbidden by Title VII. Id. at
271. Justice O'Connor's position was that the employee in a disparate treatment case
can attempt to establish, using direct evidence, that an "illegitimate criterion was a
substantial factor" in the decision. Id. at 276. At this point, the burden of persuasion
would shift to the employer to prove that the employment decision would have been
different if based only on legitimate considerations. Id. at 278.
Any substantive difference between Justice O'Connor's "substantial factor" and
the plurality's "motivating" factor is unclear. Schwartz, supra note 24, at 534 n.240.
O'Connor provided only a clue to the meaning of "substantial factor" when she
asserted that stray remarks made outside of the decision-making context would not be
substantial. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For the
plurality's definition of "motivating factor," see supra note 107.
Justice White agreed with the plurality's result and particularly with its reliance
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Thus, the plurality limited McDonnell Douglas to cases involv-
ing a single motive.
The dissent in Price Waterhouse appropriately criticized
the plurality's inconsistent rejection and subsequent accept-
ance of the "but for" standard of causation." 3 It criticized the
departure from the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine paradigm in
shifting the burden of proof to the employer to show an
absence of discrimination. 114 The dissent cited Burdine in sup-
port of its contention that the Court intended the McDonnell
Douglas test to apply where either direct or indirect evidence
was offered.115
The dissent also reflected the concern that courts will be
faced with an onerous burden when forced to decide whether
to apply McDonnell Douglas or Price Waterhouse. The choice
between tests would require that the lower courts make "sub-
tle and difficult" distinctions."1 The dissent further argued
that the confusion in choosing and applying these tests would
be magnified in the age discrimination context, where the
employee has the right to a trial by jury"7 and where the jury
is likely to be confused by complex burden shifting algo-
rithms.118 The dissent was persuaded that, instead of creating
a new test, the McDonnell Douglas principle of requiring
employees to retain the burden of persuasion offered the best
procedure for determining whether discrimination had
occurred. 119
Price Waterhouse demonstrates that five justices on the
Court have serious doubts about the efficacy of the McDonnell
Douglas test in the mixed motive setting.' 2° The results advo-
on Mt Healthy. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258. He also agreed with Justice
O'Connor's position that the employee should be required to show that the
discriminatory motive was a "substantial factor" in making its decision but disagreed
with the plurality position that the employer should be required to introduce objective
evidence to carry its burden. Id. at 260-61.
113. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 281-86 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 286-287.
115. Id. at 287 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 256 (1980)). The dissent also argued that the test would be limited to a small
number of cases because it would only be applied in the few cases where direct
evidence is available. Id. at 290-91.
116. Id. at 291.
117. The plaintiff does not have a right to trial by jury in Title VII actions. See
generally Fayssoux, supra note 18, at 603.
118. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 292 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 292-93.
120. Although Congress has not yet clarified burdens of proof in mixed motive
discrimination cases, the recently enacted amendment to Title VII specifically
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cated by the plurality, White, and O'Connor share the least
common denominator of shifting the burden of proof to the
employer after the employee's strong evidentiary showing and
of requiring the employer to prove that its actions would not
have been different absent the discrimination. This result par-
allels the Eleventh Circuit's adoption of a "but for" standard in
direct evidence cases.' 1
Thus, in both direct evidence and mixed motive cases, the
Court has departed from the McDonnell Douglas model for
allocating burdens of proof when employees offer direct evi-
dence of discrimination. Trans World Airlines suggests that,
once an employee establishes discrimination through direct
evidence, no further inquiry is required to establish discrimina-
tion. In addition, the Eleventh Circuit has found that when
employees present direct evidence of discrimination, their
employers can only overcome the evidence by showing that
they would have made the same decision "but for" the discrim-
inatory behavior. The Court in Price Waterhouse applied a
similar "but for" standard in mixed motive cases.
IV. WASHINGTON'S ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW
In addition to asserting claims under the ADEA and Title
VII, employees in Washington may assert claims under Wash-
ington's own anti-discrimination statute.'22 Generally, Wash-
ington courts interpret this statute in accordance with the
McDonnell Douglas test.
The state anti-discrimination statute declares acts of dis-
crimination based on "race, creed, color, national origin, sex,
marital status, age, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or
physical handicap" to be a matter of state concern and creates
acknowledged that "an unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice." Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071
(1991).
121. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
122. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.60.010-.330 (1989). Cases in which employees asserted
such claims include: Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wash. 2d 912, 784 P.2d 1258 (1990) (age
discrimination); Grimwood v. University of Puget Sound, 110 Wash. 2d 355, 753 P.2d
517 (1988) (age discrimination); Stork v. International Bazaar, Inc., 54 Wash. App. 274,
774 P.2d 22 (1989) (age discrimination); Lewis v. Doll, 53 Wash. App. 203, 765 P.2d 1341
(1989) (race discrimination); Prater v. Kent, 40 Wash. App. 639, 699 P.2d 1248 (1985)
(sex discrimination); Hollingsworth v. Washington Mut. Say. Bank, 37 Wash. App. 386,
681 P.2d 845 (1984) (race discrimination); Kinney v. Bauch, 23 Wash. App. 88, 596 P.2d
1074 (1979) (sex discrimination).
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a state agency to eliminate and prevent such discrimination.m
The statute also defines employer practices that will be consid-
ered unfair. It prohibits employers from refusing to hire a per-
son in a protected class unless the refusal is based on a bona
fide occupational qualification. '4 It also bars the discharge of
such employees based on age.' It bans discrimination
through differences in compensation or in other terms or con-
ditions of employment.' Finally, the statute prohibits dis-
criminatory advertisements and application forms.'
The legislature has specified that the statute is to be con-
strued liberally;' s this provision has been acknowledged by
the Washington courts.' The state statute, like its federal
counterpart, however, does not contain a specific allocation of
the burdens for proving discrimination.130 As a result, Wash-
ington courts have looked to federal case law for guidance in
construing the state statute.'3
For example, in Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,' 32 the
Washington Supreme Court drew on "a series of federal cases"
to hold that the McDonnell Douglas approach applies to age
123. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.010 (1990). To assert age discrimination under
Washington law, the employee must be between the ages of forty and seventy. WASH.
REV. CODE § 49.60.205 (1990).
124. WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.180(1) (1990).
125. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.180(2) (1990).
126. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.180(3) (1990).
127. WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.180(4) (1990).
128. WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.020 (1990).
129. Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wash. 2d 384, 388, 583 P.2d 621, 622-23 (1978).
130. When the legislature originally enacted Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180, it
specifically barred advertisements and job applications that "directly or indirectly"
made reference to the employee's race, creed, color, or national origin. 1957 Wash.
Laws ch. 37, § 9. This language suggests an understanding that not all discriminatory
actions can be shown with direct evidence. It also suggests that either direct or
indirect evidence can be the basis for the same cause of action. The Senate removed
"directly or indirectly" from Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180 when passing the
amendments proposed by House Bill 22; today that language is no longer a part of the
statute. SENATE JOURNAL 814 (1961). Interestingly, the language was removed in the
same year in which age discrimination was added to the statute as a prohibited activity.
1961 Wash. Laws ch. 100, § 1.
The deletion of this clause may evince an understanding that the appellations
were moot because the statute never distinguished between the two types of evidence.
Therefore, the legislature probably intended to treat both types of cases uniformly.
The legislative materials provide no clue as to the purpose of the deletion.
131. See supra note 11 (examples of Washington courts following federal
interpretation of Title VII and ADEA to allocate burdens of proof in discrimination
cases).
132. 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977).
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discrimination cases brought under the Washington statute.'33
The court found that the employee bore the initial burden of
presenting a prima facie case of discrimination."s A prima
facie case is established when the employee shows that he or
she (1) was within a protected class, (2) asked to retire early
against his or her will, (3) doing work of apparently satisfac-
tory quality, and (4) replaced by a younger person.1" The bur-
den then shifts to the employer to show that the employee was
discharged for reasons other than age.'- In applying this test,
the Roberts court found that the plaintiff had not proved a
prima facie case.'3 Subsequent cases have also demonstrated
the difficulties faced by the employee in proving a prima facie
case of age discrimination." s
133. Id. at 892, 568 P.2d at 767.
134. Id.
135. The court's opinion recast the second of the four elements of the prima fade
test articulated in McDonnell Douglas to reflect the factual elements of this case,
which involved allegations of forced early retirement. See Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 892-93, 568 P.2d 764, 767-68 (1977).
136. Id. at 892, 568 P.2d at 767. The court required that the employer "show" that
the employee was discharged for non-age related reasons; this burden seems closer to
the higher "prove" standard than to the "articulate" standard settled on by the
Supreme Court in Sweeney. Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978). See
supra note 60. Note that Roberts predates Sweeney. The court's choice of words may
have been unintentional.
The court in Roberts did not mention the third prong of the McDonnell Douglas
test. Because the court found that the employee in Roberts failed to establish a prima
facie case of age discrimination, it was not required to reach either the second or third
steps of McDonnell Douglas. Thus, the court's discussion of the second step is dicta in
this case.
137. Roberts, 88 Wash. 2d at 892, 568 P.2d at 767. In Roberts the court found that
although the employee established the first and third elements of the prima facie case,
the employee failed to establish that he was required to participate in the company's
retirement program. Id. The court's decision that the employee was not discriminated
against turned on the absence of compulsory participation in the retirement program.
Id.
138. In Brady v. Daily World, 105 Wash. 2d 770, 718 P.2d 785 (1986), the court
found that the employee did not establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. The
court, citing Roberts, identified four factors that the employee must establish in order
to prove a prima facie case: (1) The employee is in a protected class, (2) the employee
was discharged, (3) the employee was doing apparently satisfactory work, and (4) the
employee was replaced by a younger person. Id. at 777, 718 P.2d at 788. The court
found that Brady did not satisfy the test's requirements because he was replaced by
someone within the protected age group. Id. Because the prima facie case was not
established, the court went no further in specifying standards for allocating burdens of
proof.
Note that the fourth element of the prima facie case later fell from grace in both
federal and state courts. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1012-13, 1014 (1st Cir.
1979); Grimwood v. University of Puget Sound, 110 Wash. 2d 355, 363, 753 P.2d 517, 521
(1988).
116 University of Puget Sound Law Review
The Washington Supreme Court did find that an employee
established a prima facie case in Grimwood v. University of
Puget Sound.'39 In so doing, the court cited with approval the
elements of the prima facie case set out in Roberts and found
the McDonnell Douglas test to be an appropriate device for
allocating burdens in age discrimination cases."4 However, the
court warned, citing federal case law, that the McDonnell
Douglas test "should not be viewed as providing a format into
which all cases of discrimination should somehow fit."'' Nev-
ertheless, following McDonnell Douglas, the court explained
that the employer must articulate "a legitimate, non-discrimi-
natory reason for termination" once an employee establishes a
prima facie case.142 After the employer meets this burden, the
burden shifts back to the employee to prove that the
employer's reasons were pretextual. 143 Thus, the employee's
burden is one of persuasion, and the employer's burden is one
of production.144
When viewed together, these cases show that Washington
courts have, for the most part, used the McDonnell Douglas
approach when analyzing employment age discrimination
cases. By adopting the McDonnell Douglas approach, Washing-
ton courts have inherited the analytical deficiencies in the
McDonnell Douglas analysis. None of these cases make clear
what kind of evidence should be used to establish the prima
facie showing. Additionally, the foregoing cases cast no light
on how to analyze cases in which only one of the employer's
motives was discriminatory.
V. THE STATE RESPONSE TO THE FEDERAL CHALLENGE
Twenty-nine days after the Supreme Court decided Price
Waterhouse, Division I of the Washington Court of Appeals
decided Stork v. International Bazaar, Inc."4 Mae Stork, a
139. 110 Wash. 2d 355, 753 P.2d 517 (1988). In Grimwood, the employee was the
director of food services for a private university. Id. at 356, 753 P.2d at 517. The
university fired him after 15 years of employment. Id. at 356-57, 753 P.2d at 517. The
university provided him with a termination notice detailing specific acts of
noncooperation that referenced an earlier memorandum to the plaintiff regarding his
uncooperative behavior. Id. at 357, 753 P.2d at 517-18.
140. Id. at 362, 753 P.2d at 520.
141. I& at 363, 753 P.2d at 521 (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 364, 753 P.2d at 521.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 54 Wash. App. 274, 774 P.2d 22 (1989). The briefs for Stork were written well
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sixty-four-year-old sales clerk in her employer's retail busi-
ness, applied for the position of store manager at the encour-
agement of the store's former manager. 1 " Although Stork was
qualified for the job, the employer hired someone else to fill
the position, asserting that the successful candidate, unlike
Stork, had a business administration degree as well as manage-
ment, business, and exporting experience. 4" In spite of these
apparently legitimate motives, the consultant who made the
hiring decision told the former store manager that Stork was
not promoted because she was "too old."' 4  After the new
manager was hired, he attempted to reduce the scope of
Stork's duties because of her age.' 49
The court began its analysis by looking to federal cases
construing the ADEA for guidance in age discrimination
cases. 150 The court noted that there are three different meth-
ods of establishing a prima facie case: (1) by creating a
McDonnell Douglas inference of intent to discriminate; (2) by
establishing direct evidence of intent to discriminate; and
(3) by introducing statistical proof of a discriminatory pat-
tern.'5 ' The court went on to summarize the shifting burdens
required under the McDonnell Douglas analysis after the
employee establishes a prima facie case.5 2 The results were
then contrasted with what the court perceived to be the higher
standard of proof required of the employer under Buckley and
Price Waterhouse.'" The court noted, however, that Washing-
ton courts had not resolved the issue of whether tests other
than McDonnell Douglas would be recognized as the basis for a
before the Supreme Court decided Price Waterhouse. Brief for Appellant, Stork v.
International Bazaar, Inc., 54 Wash. App. 274, 774 P.2d 22 (1989) (No. 21251-6-I); Brief
for Respondent, Stork v. International Bazaar, Inc., 54 Wash. App. 274, 774 P.2d 22
(1989) (No. 21251-6-I).
146. Stork, 54 Wash. App. at 276, 774 P.2d at 23.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 277, 774 P.2d at 24.
150. Id. at 278, 774 P.2d at 24.
151. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Hospital Corp. of America, 758 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th
Cir. 1985)).
152. Stork, 54 Wash. App. at 278, 774 P.2d at 24.
153. Id. In the court's view of Buckley and Price Waterhouse, once the plaintiff
establishes that the discriminatory factor played a substantial part in the employment
decision, the defendant can rebut by showing that the same decision would have been
made absent any illegitimate motive. Id. at 280, 774 P.2d at 25-26. 'This is unlike the
McDonnell Douglas analysis, where the employer's burden is to merely articulate a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason." Id. at 281, 774 P.2d at 26.
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prima facie case. 154 As a result, the question of whether direct
evidence of discrimination triggers a division of the burdens of
proof that differs from McDonnell Douglas was one of first
impression for the court.155
Because Stork had not raised the issue of a separate stan-
dard of proof in direct evidence cases, the court of appeals
ruled that the issue could not be considered for the first time
on appeal.1m Nevertheless, the court concluded in lengthy
dicta that it did not recognize a separate standard of proof for
direct evidence age discrimination cases.
157 '
In support of its position, the court first asserted that a
"uniform procedure"'"M was needed for age discrimination
actions. It characterized Grimwood as making "no distinction
between direct and indirect evidence."'159 Note, however, that
the reason the Grimwood court made no such distinction was
that none was required on the facts; the employee in
Grimwood presented no direct evidence of age discrimination.
Thus, a separate test was not required.16
The court in Stork next argued that separate standards for
burdens of proof for direct and indirect evidence cases would
be confusing for the jury.1 1 It feared that the jury would be
puzzled when it was told that the employee bears the burden
of proof but that when direct evidence is presented, the burden
shifts to the employer. 62
Finally, the court asserted that the distinction between
direct and indirect evidence was moot because direct evidence
could be used in the McDonnell Douglas scheme to show that
the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons advanced by the
154. Id. at 279, 774 P.2d at 25.
155. Stork v. International Bazaar, Inc., 54 Wash. App. 274, 279, 774 P.2d 22, 25
(1989).
156. Id. at 282, 774 P.2d at 26.
157. Id. at 283, 774 P.2d at 27.
158. Id. at 282, 774 P.2d at 26.
159. Id. at 282, 774 P.2d at 27.
160. Grimwood v. University of Puget Sound, 110 Wash. 2d 355, 753 P.2d 517
(1988). Grimwood's own deposition demonstrated that he presented no direct
evidence. When asked about the basis of his claim, he responded, "I don't feel I was
given sufficiently good reason for my termination so I feel it has to be fundamentally
another reason and that's all I can come up with." Id. at 361, 753 P.2d at 519.
Grimwood is a classic situation of an employee alleging that an inference of
discrimination was created by the employer's actions. Therefore, the court did not
reach the question of whether a different type of proof would be required if direct
evidence were available.
161. Stork, 54 Wash. App. at 282-83, 774 P.2d at 27.
162. Id. at 283, 774 P.2d at 27.
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employer were pretextual.l a Significantly absent was any dis-
cussion of the mixed motive/single motive dichotomy
presented by the Price Waterhouse plurality. The court of
appeals apparently viewed Price Waterhouse as providing a
separate standard for direct evidence cases.'
Thus, the court in Stork established in dicta that it did not
recognize two separate standards of proof in age discrimination
cases. Rather, the court maintained the burden shifting analy-
sis established by McDonnell Douglas and its progeny. Specifi-
cally, the pattern remained that the employee must first
establish a prima facie case; the employer must then articulate
a legitimate reason for the employee's discharge; finally, the
employee must rebut the employer's reasons as pretextual.
In maintaining this framework in Stork, the court failed to
apply the Price Waterhouse test and require the employer to
show that it would have made the same decision absent consid-
eration of age. Moreover, the court required the employee to
prove that, "but for" age, the same decision would not have
been made.'5 This result rejects the Price Waterhouse analy-
sis and ignores the difficulties employees have in obtaining
information about an employer's internal decision making pro-
cess. Although the court presented policy reasons for depart-
ing from the federal analysis, it did not substantively analyze
those policies or demonstrate how its result was superior. The
court also failed to show that any of its rationale was based on
the differing language of the state law.
Washington courts have done little to shed light on the
163. Id. at 282, 774 P.2d at 27. This assertion may be an indirect reference to the
language in Burdine asserting that, in the third prong of the McDonnell Douglas test,
the employee has the option of using direct evidence to persuade the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely than not influenced the employer. Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1980).
As noted earlier, several circuit courts have argued that this burden is carried out
when the employee establishes "but for" causation. See supra note 64 and
accompanying text. This result is the same "but for" causation standard as in Price
Waterhouse but places the burden on the employee. Moreover, this result clearly
controverts the policy behind placing the burden on the employer. As described by the
Supreme Court, "[i]t is fair that ... (the employer] bear the risk that the influence of
legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he knowingly created the risk
and because the risk was created not by innocent activity but by his own wrongdoing."
NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1982).
164. Stark, 54 Wash. App. at 280, 774 P.2d at 25. Justice O'Connor viewed direct
evidence as the dispositive factor in shifting the burden of proof to the employer in
Price Waterhouse, but direct evidence was not explicitly required by the plurality.
165. Id. at 285, 774 P.2d at 28.
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Stork results in subsequent age discrimination cases."6  In
DeLisle v. FMC Corp.,6 7 a forty-six-year-old sales representa-
tive for the employer corporation was dismissed."6 His former
sales territory was combined with another territory, and the
combined territory was managed by a younger employee.
169
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
employer.
170
The Court of Appeals, Division I, found that the employee
would have prevailed on appeal if the evidence showed that he
would have been selected to represent the new combined sales
territory "but for" his age.17' The court did not indicate
whether the employer or the employee would have to meet
this burden. Because the "but for" test was not being used to
render judgment for the employee but rather to reverse sum-
mary judgment for the employer,'72 the decision sheds little
light on the ultimate distribution of the burden of proof in age
discrimination cases.
Another post-Stork case goes even further to suggest that
Washington courts are willing to accept the "but for" standard
of causation under some circumstances. In Allison v. Housing
Auth. of Seattle,173 the court held that when the employee
alleges a retaliatory discharge, the employer must show that it
would have made the same decision "but for" the protected
activity.174  Although anti-retaliation and anti-discrimination
are treated in separate parts of the statute, the court noted
166. See Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wash. 2d 912, 784 P.2d 1258 (1990) (court implied a
cause of action under Wash. Rev. Code § 49.44.090 for employment discrimination and
used the McDonnell Douglas analysis as articulated in Grimwood to determine
whether discrimination had occurred); Bulaich v. AT&T Information Systems, 113
Wash. 2d 254, 778 P.2d 1031 (1989) (court applied McDonnell Douglas analysis to case
involving no direct evidence of discrimination); DeLisle v. FMC Corp., 57 Wash. App.
79, 786, P.2d 839 (1990) (court placed "but for" burden on employer to resolve
summary judgment issue); Hatfield v. Columbia Fed. Sav. Bank, 57 Wash. App. 876,
790 P.2d 1258 (1990) (court used modified version of McDonnell Douglas to show that
employee had created an inference of discriminatory intent).
167. 57 Wash. App. 79, 786 P.2d 839 (1990).
168. Id. at 81, 786 P.2d at 840.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 82, 786 P.2d at 840.
171. Id. at 82, 786 P.2d at 841.
172. The court emphasized that this reversal was due to the fact that a summary
judgment was being appealed, and "summary judgment in favor of employees is
seldom appropriate in employment discrimination cases." Id. In addition, this case is
of limited usefulness because it does not indicate which party needs to establish
causation.
173. 59 Wash. App. 624, 799 P.2d 1195 (1990).
174. Id. at 628, 799 P.2d at 1197.
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that it could "discern no logical reason for imposing different
standards of causation in discrimination and retaliation
cases."' 7 5 The Allison court interpreted its holding as bringing
the law of retaliation claims "into conformity" with the law of
discrimination claims."7 6 This interpretation suggests that, as
in the Stork decision, the employee must establish the "but
for" causation. However, the Allison court did not specifically
identify who bears the burden of proving the "but for" causa-
tion. Thus, the language in Allison could be cited by a future
court to ratify the Price Waterhouse result and bring state law
into conformity with federal law.
177
The Court of Appeals, Division III, also recently reversed
a summary judgment decision in favor of an employer in an
age discrimination case in Hatfield v. Columbia Fed. Say.
175. Id. at 628 & n.2, 799 P.2d at 1197 & n.2.
176. Id. at 628, 799 P.2d at 1197.
177. Some state courts have explicitly shifted the burden of proof to the employer
in the mixed-motive setting. In Brown v. Denver Symphony Ass'n, 794 P.2d 1011
(Colo. App. 1989), the symphony claimed that Brown was fired due to gross
insubordination involving a dispute as to whether the union's collective bargaining
agreement covered complimentary breakfasts. Id. at 1012. Brown alleged that his
supervisor made several statements indicating that he was too old for the job. Id. The
court shifted the burden to the employer to justify its decision to terminate because
"[i]t is fair that he bear the risk that the influence of legal and illegal motives cannot
be separated, because he knowingly created the risk and because the risk was created
... by his own wrong doing." Id. at 1013.
In Landals v. George A. Rolfes Co., 454 N.W.2d 891, 893-94 (Iowa 1990), the court
held that if the employee presents direct evidence of discrimination and if the
employer argues that other factors influenced the same decision, the employer bears
the burden of proving that the same decision would have been made without the
illegitimate factor.
In Smith v. FDC Corp., 109 N.M. 514, 787 P.2d 433 (1990), the court tracked the
Trans World Airlines result and found that when the employee introduces direct
evidence that the discrimination was due to an impermissible factor, no further inquiry
is required to establish the employer's liability. Id.
Not all states have lightened the employee's burden of proof in the wake of Price
Waterhouse. See, e.g., West Virginia Inst. of Tech. v. West Virginia Human Rights
Comm'n, - W. Va. -, 383 S.E.2d 490 (1989). Although Price Waterhouse was
mentioned in a footnote, the West Virginia court reiterated its ruling in an earlier case
that to prove disparate-treatment employment discrimination, the employee must
show (1) that the employee belongs to a protected class, (2) that the employer made a
decision adverse to the employee, and (3) that the same decision would not have been
made absent the impermissible behavior. Id. at -, 383 S.E.2d at 494. The footnote
cited Price Waterhouse for the proposition that all protected classes are treated the
same under Title VII; the more substantive provisions of Price Waterhouse were
ignored. Id. at -, 383 S.E.2d at 494 n.8.
Although not all state courts have adopted the Price Waterhouse analysis, the fact
that several have done so indicates that the Price Waterhouse analysis can be helpful
in examining burden of proof issues at the state level.
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Bank.7 ' When discussing whether the employee had success-
fully established a prima facie case of age discrimination, the
court noted that the McDonnell Douglas framework did not
provide the sole method for proving a prima facie case.'79 The
court also remarked that the fourth element of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie test had been dispensed with in "cases
where the plaintiff had introduced direct or circumstantial evi-
dence of discriminatory intent . ..""
In contrast to federal courts, however, the Hafteld court
did not see proof of discrimination by direct evidence as an
alternative to a prima facie case creating an inference of dis-
crimination. Rather, the court saw direct evidence as another
method of creating that prima facie inference.'"' Because the
court did not state whether the inference created by the
employee was based on direct, circumstantial, or indirect evi-
dence, the court failed to clarify whether the character of the
evidence influenced the allocations of burdens of proof.8 2
Although the court stated that the requirements for prov-
ing the prima facie case could be modified if the employee
presented direct evidence of discrimination, the employee in
Hatjeld apparently did not offer direct evidence of discrimina-
tion. Even though the court's comments about direct evidence
178. 57 Wash. App. 876, 790 P.2d 1258 (1990). In Hatfield, the plaintiff was a vice
president in the employer's loan department when a senior management official
offered him a position coordinating a change in the bank's data processing system. Id.
at 878, 790 P.2d at 1259. Although the conversion itself would take only eight months,
the management official suggested that the job would continue for at least three to five
years. Id. However, the position was eliminated as soon as the conversion was
complete, and no comparable position was found for him. Id.
179. Id. at 882, 790 P.2d at 1261 (quoting Grimwood v. University of Puget Sound,
110 Wash. 2d 355, 363, 753 P.2d 517, 520-21 (1988)).
180. Hatfield, 57 Wash. App. at 882, 790 P.2d at 1261 (quoting BARBARA SCHLEI &
PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (2d ed. 1983)).
181. Compare Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 774 (11th Cir.
1982) ("Where strong, direct evidence is presented, reliance on McDonnell Douglas as
the exclusive means of proving the case and as the proper form of rebuttal is
incorrect") and Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) ("[Ihe
McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of
discrimination") with Hatfield, 57 Wash. App. at 882-83, 790 P.2d at 1261 (plaintiff
created an "inference" of discriminatory intent without strictly meeting the
McDonnell Douglas criteria).
182. The evidence used by the court included statements by Hatfield's supervisor
that Hatfield was initially told that the position could involve growth. Hatfield, 57
Wash. App. at 882, 790 P.2d at 1261. The supervisor later claimed that the work was
not being done, but the statements of other employees did not support this assertion.
Id. at 882-83, 790 P.2d at 1261. This evidence appears to be more circumstantial than
direct.
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are probably dicta, they demonstrate a willingness on the part
of at least one Washington court to soften the McDonnell
Douglas requirements for proving a prima facie case if the
employee produces direct evidence of discrimination.
The Hatfield court also suggested that a "but for" standard
should be used to evaluate age discrimination. "The ultimate
factor," said the court, "is whether age was a factor in a deci-
sion of an employer to terminate [a] ... claimant and whether
the age of the claimant made a difference in determining
whether he was to be retained or discharged."' 3 Although the
court did not apply this test, it suggests a willingness to con-
sider whether the employer would have made the same deci-
sion absent a discriminatory motive.
The Hatfield decision demonstrates that the Court of
Appeals is willing to modify the McDonnell Douglas formula
in age discrimination cases. The court cited commentary not-
ing that the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie case had been dropped in reduction-in-force cases and in
cases where the employee "introduced direct or circumstantial
evidence of the discriminatory intent . . .,,. Although
Hatfield did not go so far as to shift the burden of persuasion
in direct evidence cases, it recognized the value of reducing
rigid requirements on the employee when a stronger showing
of discrimination was made.
In conclusion, Washington courts have failed to reconcile
Stork with Price Waterhouse in the two years since Stork was
decided. In Delisle and Allison, the court mentioned a "but
for" test without specifying which party bore the burden of
proving it, and neither case dealt with the direct evidence or
mixed motive questions. The court in Hatfield treated direct
evidence as one method of creating a prima facie case of dis-
crimination, suggesting in dicta that direct evidence of discrim-
ination might reduce the employee's burden of proof under
McDonnell Douglas.
Because Stork and subsequent Washington discrimination
cases do not adequately explain the reasons for rejecting a sep-
arate test for direct evidence and mixed motive cases, the next
Section addresses the criticisms of using a separate test for
direct evidence and mixed motive cases, demonstrating that
183. Id. at 882, 790 P.2d at 1261 (quoting Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp.,
670 F.2d 66, 70 (6th Cir. 1982)).
184. Id.
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any perceived weakness in using such a test can be minimized
by procedural tools.
VI. PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
The Stork court chose not to adopt the Trans World Air-
lines or Price Waterhouse results because of policy concerns
and perceived difficulties in their application. The Price
Waterhouse dissent leveled similar criticisms."" This Section
analyzes these criticisms and explores whether the courts
could address these criticisms, where valid, without throwing
the Price Waterhouse baby out with the bath water.
A. Confusing the Jury
In Stork, the court's primary criticism of Price Waterhouse
was that instructing the jury about the appropriate test would
be difficult, thus confusing the jury. i 86 The potential for jury
confusion can be tested by determining (1) whether having the
direct evidence test is more confusing to juries than not having
it, and (2) whether tools such as jury instructions, special ver-
dicts, and summary judgment can be used to minimize poten-
tial confusion.
Would having a direct evidence test separate from the
McDonnell Douglas test be more confusing to jurors than
requiring the McDonnell Douglas analysis to be used regard-
less of the type of evidence introduced? Some commentators
and jurists find application of the McDonnell Douglas analysis,
which the Stork court applies, to be confusing as it stands. 8 7
For example, in Price Waterhouse, the dissenting Justice Ken-
nedy acknowledged that courts have "long had difficulty" in
the application of McDonnell Douglas and Burdine.l'8
185. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 288 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
186. Stork v. International Bazaar, Inc., 54 Wash. App. 274, 282-83, 774 P.2d 22, 27
(1989). The Price Waterhouse dissent reached the same conclusion. 490 U.S. at 292
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
187. Sutton, supra note 18, at 1219-22. The author notes that federal age
discrimination cases, in contrast to the bulk of Title VII cases, are tried before a jury.
As a result, problems arise in instructing the jury that were absent in the initial
setting of McDonnell Douglas. Id. at 1219.
See also Fayssoux, supra note 18, at 626-27. The author argues that the application
of McDonnell Douglas to the jury setting has raised a great deal of confusion, which is
evident from the many reversals of verdicts entered by juries in favor of ADEA
plaintiffs. The author believes that the problem is best remedied by allowing more
weight to the juries' subjective assessment of witness credibility.
188. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 291 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court attempted to streamline the applica-
tion of the McDonnell Douglas test, and thus rid the test of its
confusion, in United States Postal Serv. Bd of Govs. v. Aik-
ens.8 9 The Court found that when the employer makes a
showing of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
allegedly discriminatory act, the fact finder must then deter-
mine whether discrimination occurred."9 The Court noted
that "[a]t this stage, the McDonnell-Burdine presumption
'drops from the case.' "" Once the presumption drops, the
fact finder's inquiry is not one of presumptions and rebuttals;
rather, the fact finder is left to determine whether "the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff."' 92
At least one Washington court has affirmed the Aikens clarifi-
cation of the ultimate factual question in the state employment
discrimination setting. 93 Aikens shows that, even in the non-
jury trial setting, courts have addressed concerns about the
complexity of the McDonnell Douglas formula and possible
resulting confusion for the fact finder.
Such confusion, however, is not a foregone conclusion.
When the judge uses procedural tools in concert with a sepa-
rate test for direct evidence, the separate test will reduce
rather than create juror confusion. Prior to trial, the plaintiff
can move for a partial summary judgment on the legal issue of
whether the employee's evidence is direct.1"4 If the evidence is
direct, the employee is entitled to an instruction based on
Trans World Airlines. If the evidence is not direct, the court
can give an instruction based on McDonnell Douglas.9 The
jury would have one clear test to apply that properly places a
higher standard of proof on the employer. Thus, procedural
tools such as summary judgments and jury instructions can
189. 460 U.S. 711 (1982).
190. Id. at 715.
191. Id. (citations omitted).
192. Id. (citations omitted).
193. Hollingsworth v. Washington Mut. Say. Bank, 37 Wash. App. 386, 392, 681
P.2d 845, 849 (1984).
Where a case has been fully tried on the merits, framing the issue in terms of
whether the parties met one of the steps of analysis unnecessarily evades the
ultimate question of discrimination. The ultimate issue of discrimination is to
be treated by the courts in the same manner as any other issue of fact.
(citations omitted). Id.
194. See WASH. Cr. CIv. R. 56(d). If a party moves for partial summary judgment,
the court will make an order specifying the facts that are without controversy. Id.
195. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016-18 (1st Cir. 1979).
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minimize possible confusion from multiple tests.1l 6
Minimizing confusion through procedural tools is some-
what more difficult in mixed motive cases in which no direct
evidence is established. In such cases, the jury should apply
the Price Waterhouse test; however, deciding whether the case
is a mixed motive case is a question of fact and therefore can-
not be resolved by the judge prior to jury deliberations in a
jury trial setting. Thus, a partial summary judgment motion
would not resolve juror confusion in mixed motive cases in
which no direct evidence is established.
Commentators and the courts cannot agree as to whether
a mixed motive case could arise in which no direct evidence of
discrimination exists. Assuming that such a case could arise,
juror confusion could be minimized by the use of a special ver-
dict.19 If the judge finds no direct evidence of discrimination,
the jury would be instructed to decide first if the employer's
actions were the product of mixed motives. If the jury finds
the answer to be yes, it then would apply the Price
Waterhouse analysis. If the answer is no, the jury would fall
back on the traditional McDonnell Douglas analysis.
Jury confusion is a legitimate concern. Nevertheless,
years of potential jury confusion have not prevented either
federal or state courts from applying the McDonnell Douglas
analysis in both jury and non-jury settings. Possible jury con-
fusion should not be raised as a bar to an otherwise useful test;
rather, sources of jury confusion should be examined and
reduced by the use of procedural tools.
B. Separate Test Unnecessary
The court's second critique was that a separate test to eval-
196. While instructing the jury, Washington judges must be careful to avoid the
constitutional prohibition on commenting on matters of fact. WASH. CONST. art. IV,
§ 16. "Judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, nor comment
thereon, but shall declare the law." Id. The constitution mandates that the judge
avoid statements conveying personal attitudes about the merits of the case or allow the
jury to infer a sense of the judges' own beliefs. Id. As long as the instruction merely
states the law pertaining to the issue at hand, the judge has not made an impermissible
comment. Hamilton v. Department of Labor & Indus., 111 Wash. 2d 569, 571, 761 P.2d
618, 619 (1988).
197. The trial court has discretion to submit interrogatories to the jury. Kadiak
Fisheries Co. v. Murphy Diesel Co., 70 Wash. 2d 153, 165, 422 P.2d 496, 504 (1967). For




uate direct evidence, as in Stork, was unnecessary. 198 In the
eyes of the court, the employee can use direct evidence in
showing employer pretext in the third prong of the McDonnell
Douglas analysis to demonstrate that the employer's rationale
was pretextual.19 Although this approach works in the sole
motive setting, it provides no solution in the mixed motive set-
ting. This problem can best be demonstrated by an example.
Donald was a 54 year-old employee of Corporation A. His
supervisor praised his work grudgingly, saying that although
his work was slow; it was satisfactory "for an old guy." After
one such incident, Donald cursed at the supervisor and left the
work site for the rest of the day. Donald was fired for gross
insubordination. Donald filed suit in state court, alleging that
his employer discriminated against him on the basis of age in
violation of Washington Revised Code chapter 49.60.
Donald's attorney, attempting to make a case under the
McDonnell Douglas analysis, introduces enough evidence to
present a prima facie case of discrimination. Donald's
employer responds with evidence of company policies against
using foul language in the work place and against leaving the
work site during the work day without permission. The
employer thus establishes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son for its action.
Donald uses direct evidence in rebuttal attempting to show
that the employer's reason was pretextual. The direct evi-
dence consists of Donald's supervisor's use of the "old guy"
description. His employer, however, argues that cursing the
supervisor in violation of work rules was probably a legitimate
motive for discharge. His employer may argue that Donald's
198. Stork v. International Bazaar, Inc., 54 Wash. App. 274, 282, 774 P.2d 22, 27
(1989).
199. Id. Although the court cited no authority for this criticism in Stork, its origin
is found in the Price Waterhouse dissent. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
288 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy argued that Burdine is
appropriate for direct and indirect evidence cases. Under Burdine, the employee can
prevail in the final stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis "either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer
or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 288; Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1980).
The McDonnell Douglas opinion does not explicitly illuminate this issue.
However, McDonnell Douglas suggests categories of evidence that might be used in the
final stage of the employee's case. These categories include treatment by the
employer, the employer's reaction to legitimate employee civil rights involvement, and
the employer's policy and practice regarding minority employment. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
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work was actually too slow to be satisfactory. If the employer
can prove these allegations, it will succeed in establishing a
legitimate reason for Donald's dismissal. The employer will
thus prevail unless Donald can draw on other evidence to show
that the employer's action was more likely than not the result
of discrimination. The finder of fact has made its decision
without even considering whether the employer's legitimate
reason was overshadowed by an illegitimate one.
By contrast, under the proposed analysis, the judge could
make a preliminary finding that Donald's evidence was direct
and that the jury should apply the Price Waterhouse test. In
order to return a finding for the employer, the jury would
have to find that Donald would have been fired without the
age-related conduct. Under this analysis, the jury is more
likely to return a verdict for the employee when the discharge
was prompted by an illegal motive.
This example illustrates the insufficiency of the Stork
court's solution for applying McDonnell Douglas in mixed
motive situations." Several courts, including the Supreme
Court and the Washington State Supreme Court, have cau-
tioned against the rigid application of the McDonnell Douglas
formula.20" Courts have thus adapted the McDonnell Douglas
test to meet the needs of specific types of cases.z 2 As the
example above illustrates, the employee is less likely to prevail
under the McDonnell Douglas test in mixed motive discrimina-
tion settings. Thus, the court in Stork is misguided in its belief
that the separate direct evidence test is unnecessary.
C. Limited Usefulness
Another criticism leveled at the Price Waterhouse result
was that it is applicable only in those few cases where "direct
200. The insufficiency of McDonnell Douglas was the stimulus for the Price
Waterhouse decision. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 248. The plurality found that
adoption of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine approach would require one to pretend
that the employer's decision was based on a single factor. Id.
201. Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (court held that
application of McDonnell Douglas should not be "rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic");
Grimwood v. University of Puget Sound, 110 Wash. 2d 355, 362, 753 P.2d 517, 521 (1988)
(court noted that the steps of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test were not
absolutes).
202. In Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wash. 2d 384, 391, 583 P.2d 621, 624 (1978), the
court distinguished between the showing required to meet the burden of proof in
McDonnell Douglas, a failure-to-employ case, and the case before the court, which
arose from an allegedly discriminatory transfer.
[Vol. 15:95
Age Discrimination
and substantial proof" of an unlawful motive are accompanied
by legitimate reasons for the employers actions. 3 This argu-
ment has little merit. If a different analysis provides a more
just result that more clearly realizes the goal of anti-discrimi-
nation, that analysis is beneficial even if the number of cases it
affects is small.
D. Differing State and Federal Purposes
In Stork, the court was careful to note that Washington
courts have not previously considered whether techniques
other than McDonnell Douglas can be used to establish a prima
facie case of age discrimination.' Implicit in this statement is
that what is appropriate for the federal goose may be inappro-
priate for the state gander. One reason for such a differencemight be differing state and federal legislative purposes. If dif-
ferent purposes exist for state and federal age discrimination
statutes, the courts might be justified in applying different
tests. However, this is not the case.
The Washington statute invokes the state's police power to
protect the public welfare, health, and peace to determine that
"practices of discrimination" threaten the "institutions and
foundation of a free democratic state."'  The Act's goal is to
eliminate and prevent discrimination."
The ADEA's statement of purpose is less comprehensive.
According to the statement, Congress made findings regarding
disadvantage to older workers and the burden of age discrimi-
nation based upon the flow of goods in commerce.' It then
identified the purpose of the statute as threefold: to promote
employment based on ability, not age; to ban "arbitrary"
employment discrimination; and to help employers and
employees resolve problems resulting from age discrimina-
tion.2 ° The federal statement of purpose is less aggressive
than the corresponding state statement of purpose.209
203. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 291 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
204. Stork v. International Bazaar, Inc., 54 Wash. App. 274, 279 774 P.2d 22, 25
(1989).
205. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.010 (1990).
206. Id.
207. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621(a)(1)-(4) (West 1981 & Supp. 1990).
208. Id.
209. In a comparison of the federal and state statutes, one commentator found
WASH. REv. CODE ch. 49.60 to be more comprehensive in purpose and broader in
coverage than the federal statute. Janice A. Grant, Comment, Age Discrimination in
Employrnent. A Comparison of the Federal and Washington State Statutory
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Because the statement of purpose in Washington's statute
more aggressively targets the prevention and elimination of
age discrimination than the federal statute, no statutory basis
exists for arguing that the state courts should interpret the
statute to place a heavier burden on employees than that
shouldered by employees in federal courts. Thus, state distinc-
tions from federal legislation do not explain why the court in
Stork chose not to incorporate the Price Waterhouse result
into its interpretation of state law. Indeed, if the differences
between state and federal policy have any impact, it is likely to
increase the employer's burden in state discrimination cases.
VII. CONCLUSION
The federal courts have departed from a rigid McDonnell
Douglas analysis in discrimination cases involving direct evi-
dence and mixed motives. Trans World Airlines released
employees from having to meet the McDonnell Douglas bur-
den in direct evidence cases. The federal standard established
in Price Waterhouse shifted the burden of proof to the
employer in mixed motive cases. Washington courts have
avoided such a departure to the detriment of employees who
have been harmed by employers who are motivated, in part, by
impermissible factors. By adopting the federal standard estab-
lished in Price Waterhouse, Washington can place the burden
of proof in direct evidence and mixed motive age discrimina-
tion cases with employers and thus realistically distribute the
burdens, taking into account the employers' superior access to
evidence of their own intent. Federal age discrimination legis-
lation is designed to promote employment based on ability, to
ban "arbitrary" discrimination, and to resolve problems flow-
ing from age discrimination. The more aggressively worded
state statute is designed to eliminate and prevent discrimina-
tion. Both policies are furthered by forcing the employer to
use its superior access to the proof of age discrimination when
it is faced with direct evidence of discrimination or when its
motives for acting are mixed. A separate standard for direct
evidence and mixed motive cases would more clearly reflect
the broad policies supporting both federal and state anti-dis-
crimination law.
Requirements and Recent Developments, 16 GONZ. L. REv. 637, 640-41 (1981). The
author noted, however, that courts have applied a liberal construction to both statutes.
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